Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces
| Title | Honest Ideals on Strand Spaces |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 1998 |
| Authors | Fábrega, Javier THAYER F., Jonathan Herzog, and Joshua D. Guttman |
| Conference Name | Proceedings of the 11th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW) |
| Date Published | June |
| Publisher | IEEE Computer Society Press |
| Abstract | In security protocol analysis, it is important to learn general principles that limit the abilities of an attacker, and that can be applied repeatedly to a variety of protocols. We introduce the notion of an ideal-a set of messages closed under encryption and invariant under composition with arbitrary messages-to express such principles.
In conjunction with the strand space formalism, we use the concept of ideals to prove bounds on a penetrator's capabilities, independent of the security protocol being analyzed. From this we prove a number of correctness properties of the Otway Rees protocol, using these results to explain the limitations of the protocol. |
| URL | http://files.jonathanherzog.com/thayer_honest.pdf |
