A Computational Interpretation of Dolev-Yao Adversaries
| Title | A Computational Interpretation of Dolev-Yao Adversaries |
| Publication Type | Conference Paper |
| Year of Publication | 2003 |
| Authors | Herzog, Jonathan |
| Editor | Gorrieri, Roberto |
| Conference Name | Proceedings, Workship on Issues in the Theory of Security (WITS'03) |
| Date Published | April |
| Abstract | The Dolev–Yao model is a simple and useful framework in
which to analyze security protocols, but it assumes an extremely limited
adversary. It is unclear if the results of this model would remain valid
were the adversary to be given additional power. In this work, we show
that there exist situations in which Dolev-Yao adversary can be viewed
as a valid abstraction of all realistic adversaries. We do this in two steps:
- We translate the allowed behaviors of the Dolev-Yao adversary into
the computational model, an alternate framework with a very powerful adversary.
- We show that sufficiently strong computational cryptography can
limit the computational adversary to these behaviors.
|
| URL | http://files.jonathanherzog.com/herzog_computational_workshop.pdf |
